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Abstract—Mobile apps are increasingly created using online
application generators (OAGs) that automate app development,
distribution, and maintenance. These tools significantly lower
the level of technical skill that is required for app development,
which makes them particularly appealing to citizen developers,
i.e., developers with little or no software engineering background.
However, as the pervasiveness of these tools increases, so does
their overall influence on the mobile ecosystem’s security, as
security lapses by such generators affect thousands of generated
apps. The security of such generated apps, as well as their impact
on the security of the overall app ecosystem, has not yet been
investigated.
We present the first comprehensive classification of commonly
used OAGs for Android and show how to fingerprint uniquely
generated apps to link them back to their generator. We thereby
quantify the market penetration of these OAGs based on a corpus
of 2,291,898 free Android apps from Google Play and discover
that at least 11.1% of these apps were created using OAGs. Using
a combination of dynamic, static, and manual analysis, we find
that the services’ app generation model is based on boilerplate
code that is prone to reconfiguration attacks in 7/13 analyzed
OAGs. Moreover, we show that this boilerplate code includes
well-known security issues such as code injection vulnerabilities
and insecure WebViews. Given the tight coupling of generated
apps with their services’ backends, we further identify security
issues in their infrastructure. Due to the blackbox development
approach, citizen developers are unaware of these hidden prob-
lems that ultimately put the end-users sensitive data and privacy
at risk and violate the user’s trust assumption. A particular
worrisome result of our study is that OAGs indeed have a
significant amplification factor for those vulnerabilities, notably
harming the health of the overall mobile app ecosystem.
I. INTRODUCTION
The proliferation of online application generators (OAGs)
that automate development, distribution and maintenance of
mobile apps significantly lowers the level of technical skill
that is required for application development. As a conse-
quence, creating platform-specific apps becomes amenable to
a wide range of inexperienced developers. This trend that
developers with “little or no coding or software engineering
background” [19] create software with low-code or no-code
platforms has become known as citizen developers [19], [28]
and has recently received tremendous momentum across the
industry. Moreover, many OAGs additionally promise to de-
crease the app’s overall development and maintenance costs
since they offer functionality for taking care of various tasks
across all phases of an app’s life cycle.
However, this convenience comes at the cost of an opaque
generation process in which the user/developer has to fully
trust the generated code in terms of security and privacy. A
large body of literature has revealed various security problems
in mobile apps, such as permission management [37], insecure
SSL/TLS deployment [17], [36], misuse of cryptographic
APIs [15], and inter-process communication [12]. These flaws
could be attributed to poorly trained app developers that
implemented application features in an insecure manner. With
the increasing use of OAGs the duty of generating secure code
shifts away from the app developer to the generator service.
This leaves the question whether OAGs can provide safe
and privacy-preserving default implementations of common
tasks to generate more secure apps at an unprecedented scale.
However, if they fail, their amplification effect will have a
drastic negative impact on the already concerning state of
security in mobile apps. As of now, the security implications
of OAGs have not been systematically investigated yet, and,
in particular, their impact on the security of the overall
app ecosystem remains an open question: “Do online app
generators have a positive or negative impact on the overall
app ecosystem?”
Our contribution—In this paper, we present the first clas-
sification of commonly used OAGs for Android apps on
various characteristics including their supported workflows,
automation of the app development life cycle and multi-
platform support. We proceed by showing how to uniquely
fingerprint generated apps in order to link them back to their
generator. We thereby quantify the market penetration of these
OAGs based on a corpus of 2,291,898 free Android apps from
Google Play and discover that at least 11.1% of these apps
were created using online services. This noticeable market
penetration already shows that potential security mistakes
and misconduct by OAGs would impact thousands of apps
and impose a danger for the overall health of the Android
ecosystem.
Analyzing the security of OAGs is non-trivial due to the
absence of a documentation of the development process.
Instead, these services offer a fully-automated, opaque app
generation process without the possibility to write custom
code. App developers have to fully trust that the generated
code follows security best practices and does not violate the
end-users’ privacy. In order to shed light onto the black-
box generation process, we perform a comprehensive security
audit on apps created by these services using a combination
of dynamic, static, and manual analysis. This allows us to
document their internal workflow and to discover a new
app generation model based on boilerplate code. We then
demonstrate that 7 out of 13 analyzed online application
generators fail to defend against reconfiguration attacks, thus
opening new attack surfaces of their generated apps. We
further analyze whether the generated boilerplate code adheres
to Android security best practices and whether it suffers from
known security vulnerabilities identified by prior research. Our
results, both on self-generated apps as well as apps randomly
picked from Google Play, suggest that OAGs are responsible
for producing vulnerable code including SSL/TLS verification
errors, insecure WebViews, code injection vulnerabilities
and misuse of cryptographic APIs. Within our data set, all
analyzed application generators suffer from at least one of
these vulnerabilities, combined affecting more than 250K apps
on Google Play. Finally, we have a dedicated look onto
the services’ infrastructure security. Online service-generated
apps are typically bound to their providers’ backend servers,
e.g. for license checks when the service charges a monthly
fee. In addition, some services even provide complete user-
management modules that require connections to backend
servers. Any of this functionality requires a secure client-
server communication since either sensitive (user) data is
exchanged or configuration files for the boilerplate code is
transmitted. However, our analysis reveals that many services
build on an insecure and vulnerable infrastructure, e.g. by
using insecure SSL/TLS server configurations, mixed usage
of HTTP/HTTPS and usage of outdated SSL libraries.
We conclude with a thorough discussion of our findings,
including potential alleys worth pursuing in future research on
generating secure code for such module-based app builders. In
summary, we make the following tangible contributions:
● We present the first classification of commonly used
OAGs for Android, accounting for various characteristics
such as the supported workflows, automation of the app
development life cycle, multi-platform support, and their
boilerplate-based app generation model.● We show how to fingerprint generated apps and how to
quantify the market penetration of OAGs by classifying
2,291,898 free apps from Google Play: at least 255,216
apps (11.1%) are generated using OAGs.● We derive OAG-specific attacks, such as reconfiguration
and infrastructure attacks and show how these services
fail in protecting against these attacks.● We conduct a comprehensive security audit to show that
boilerplate code generated by any of the analyzed services
violates security best practices and contains severe secu-
rity vulnerabilities. To estimate the real-world impact, we
validate our findings on real, generated apps on Play.
Outline—This paper is organized as follows. We give a
general overview of mobile app generators in Section II and
a classification of commonly used OAGs in Section III. We
describe the methodology of our security audit in Section IV,
present new, OAG-specific attack classes in Section V and
analyze known security issues in Section VI. Finally, we thor-
oughly discuss our findings in Section VII, before concluding
in Section VIII.
II. OVERVIEW OF MOBILE APPGENS
Application generators are tools for partially or even com-
pletely automating app development, distribution, and main-
tenance. The advantages of using application generators are
manifold. First, they enable developers to abstract away from
implementation aspects and to instead focus only on the
conceptual behavior of the application in terms of high-level
functionality. Second, they provide functionality beyond core
app generation, including support for app compilation, app
dissemination, and distribution of patched versions. Third,
they offer support for making an app equally applicable to
multiple competing architectures, such as Android and iOS.
Finally, they may even provide support for recurring, extended
app functionality such as user management, user login, and
data submission to back-end servers. In this section, we give
an overview of commonly used AppGen types within the
Android ecosystem based on their supported workflows. Our
investigation resulted in three distinct categories of applica-
tion generators: standalone frameworks, online services, and
software development services that we dub Developer-as-a-
Service as explained in the following.
A. Standalone frameworks
Standalone frameworks constitute tools that offer a core set
of abstract application functionality which are then refined by
additional code from the app developer. These frameworks
typically expect a program written in a platform-independent
language as input, e.g., JavaScript and HTML, or C#, and
then package user-provided code together with an execution
engine into a native app. Many of those frameworks offer
plugins that provide commonly used functionality (e.g., in-
app browsers or advertisement) or even skeletons for entire
apps, which are provided by plugin developers. While these
frameworks assist in the creation of an app, they offer little
to no support for further phases of an app’s life cycle such
as app dissemination and distribution of patched versions. To
date, these unsupported tasks are typically performed by the
app developer. Prominent examples of standalone frameworks
are Xamarin, Apache Cordova, and PhoneGap.
B. Online Services
Online services or online application generators (OAGs)
enable app development using wizard-like, point-and-click
web interfaces in which developers only need to add and
suitably interconnect UI elements that represent application
components (e.g., email or login forms, in-app browser, QR
scanner, social networking widgets, etc.). There is no need
and typically also no option to write custom code. For some
of these components, they may even provide the necessary
infrastructure such as user management, user login, and data
submission to back-end servers maintained by the service
provider. These online service tools are thus accessible even
for laymen developers that lack any prior experience in app
development. Moreover, online services offer support for au-
tomatically distributing apps over popular channels such as
the Google Play Store. In addition to extensively supporting
core tasks of the software development life cycle, online ser-
vices provide business intelligence and analysis features such
as audience reports and dashboard for analytics. Prominent
examples of online services are Andromo and Biznessapps.
C. Developer-as-a-Service
Developer-as-a-Service does not even expect developers to
contribute to the technical development of an app. Instead,
the developer rather acts as a customer that orders the whole
app creation from a contracted app development service,
which then delegates the app creation to a team of app
developers that are expected to develop the application based
on a set of explicitly spelled out customer requirements.
Such requirements are typically collected over the phone or
via emails. Widely known examples are CrowdCompass and
QuickMobile, services specialized to create customized event
and conference apps.
III. ONLINE APP GENERATORS
This section presents a classification of apps of commonly
used OAGs and an analysis of market penetration and charac-
terization of OAG-generated apps.
A. Classification
We used Google search queries to identify a rich set of
common application generators. More concretely, we simu-
lated a user who is searching for an application generator using
search terms including but not limited to: “app maker android”,
“android generate app”, and “{business, free, diy, mobile}
(android) app {generator, creator, maker}”. For each result,
we selected the first five entries after removing duplicates.
We also issued queries to online resources that offer technical
and popularity reviews of application generators such as Ap-
pindex1, Werockyourweb2, Quora3, and Businessnewsdaily4.
We excluded non-online-services and application generators
from our analysis, when we were not able to meaningfully
assess their market penetration, i.e., we could not determine
whether any available app was generated using these particular
application generators, see Section III-B.
We have classified all application generators along four
dimensions: freeware, multi-platform support, components,
and publishing, see the columns on “Classification” in Table 1.
Freeware—Some application generators can be freely used
( ), while others require a monetary investment ( ).
Multi-platform support—While traditional app development
requires developers to write distinct apps for each mobile
platform like Android, iOS, and Windows Mobile, many
1http://appindex.com/blog/app-builders-app-makers-list/
2http://www.werockyourweb.com/mobile-app-builder/
3https://www.quora.com/What-are-the-best-mobile-app-creators-for-non-
coders-both-free-and-paid
4http://www.businessnewsdaily.com/4901-best-app-makers-creators.html
application generators allow developers to develop for one
platform and then automatically generate “native” apps for
additional platforms ( ). We write ( ) if this multi-platform
functionality is not provided.
Components—Many application generators offer supplemen-
tary components for common tasks such as ads, app analytics,
crash reporting, and user management. We write ( ) if features
can be conveniently added via simple web forms, e.g. by
means of checkboxes; ( ) if users have to rely on visual
programming interfaces to add and remove features; and ( )
if supplementary components are not offered.
Publishing support—Conventional app development requires
developers to write code, compile, and sign an APK, and then
distribute it to their users. While writing code, compiling and
signing an APK is arguably a smooth process using dedicated
IDEs (e.g., Android Studio), app distribution usually requires
further manual effort: register a Google Play account (or
an account for an alternative market), upload the app, add
description text and publish. Some application generators offer
to automate this complete chain from producing and signing
an app to publishing it on one or multiple markets ( ) , while
others only automate parts of this support chain( ) or do not
offer support at all ( ).
B. Fingerprinting Application Generators
Once we established and classified our set of online ser-
vices, we aimed at quantifying the market penetration of the
individual application generators. To do this in a meaningful
manner without relying on bold marketing claims, we identify
the number of Android apps generated by the individual
application generators. To this end, we first identified unique
features of application generators as fingerprints, and then
used these features to classify a large corpus of 2,291,898
unique free Android apps. We collected these apps from the
Google Play Store between August 2015 and May 2017 using
a crawler. The crawler starts with a set of URL seeds and
subsequently follows the recommendation links to explore the
store. Our crawler revisits previously found apps once per day
and downloads them only if new versions are available. Our
analysis considered only the latest version of each app.
1) Features: We extracted unique features of application
generators using differential analysis between a baseline app5
and sample apps from each application generator. We then
manually reverse-engineered all sample apps and created a diff
between our baseline app and the sample apps based on the
components of a typical Android app. To create this diff, we
first analyzed the composition of an Android app, and then
identified all parts that can be used to tell apart generated
apps and manually developed apps. Our analysis resulted in
the following four features (the latter two can be sub-classified,
totaling six distinct Fingerprinting Features, see Table 1):
App Package Names—The first distinctive feature of apps
is the app package name. Package names are unique text
5We used the default Android IDE Android Studio to create a single-activity
“Hello World” Android app that did not include any external third-party library
Table 1: Classification and fingerprinting of online services sorted by category and app count. For each AppGen, we found
multiple distinguishing fingerprint features, but, in all cases, a single feature is already sufficient to uniquely classify an
application generator.
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Seattle Cloud 60,314 http://seattleclouds.com/
Andromo 45,850 http://www.andromo.com/
Apps Geyser 29,190 http://www.appsgeyser.com/
Biznessapps 27,130 http://www.biznessapps.com/
Appinventor 25,338 http://appinventor.mit.edu/explore/
AppYet 15,281 http://www.appyet.com/
Como 10,894 http://www.como.com/
Tobit Chayns 8,242 http://en.tobit.com/chayns
Mobincube 8,074 http://www.mobincube.com/
Appy Pie 4,445 http://www.appypie.com/
Appmachine 4,409 http://www.appmachine.com/
Good Barber 3,622 http://www.goodbarber.com/
Shoutem 2,638 http://www.shoutem.com/
App Yourself 2,273 http://appyourself.net/
Mippin App Factory 1,785 http://www.mippin.com/appfactory/
Apps Builder 1,191 http://www.apps-builder.com/
Appmakr 1,058 http://appmakr.com/
appery.io 846 https://appery.io/
Apps Bar 700 http://www.appsbar.com/
Mobile Roadie 581 http://mobileroadie.com/
App Gyver 386 http://www.appgyver.io
Appconfector 337 http://www.appconfector.de
Rho Mobile Suite 216 http://rhomobile.com/
Appsme 158 http://www.appsme.com/
App Titan 152 http://www.apptitan.de/
Applicationcraft 100 http://www.applicationcraft.com/
Paradise Apps 3 http://www.paradiseapps.net/
Eachscape 3 http://eachscape.com/
= yes/applies; ; = applies partly; = no/does not apply
strings that are used by Google Play to unambiguously identify
apps. Application generators often use patterns for generated
apps that in turn can be used as a distinctive feature, e.g.,
com.Tobit.* or {com|net}.andromo.dev*.
Code Namespaces—Java code is organized in namespaces
and similar to package names, application generators may
use particular namespaces that we can leverage for our
classification. Andromo apps, for example, include code
namespaces that contain the substring .andromo.dev or
the prefix com.andromo. A similar example are Tobit
Chayns apps, which include code namespaces with the pre-
fix com.Tobit.android.slitte.Slitte. In contrast,
Apps Geyser apps include code namespaces with the prefix
com.w*, which is not suitable for classification purposes due
to its ambiguity (see Section III-B2 for further details).
Signing Keys—Before uploading an app to Google Play,
APKs must be digitally signed. This is a security mechanism
to ensure that app updates are distributed by the same entity
(e.g., developer). A single key is often used to sign multiple
apps, e.g., Seattle Cloud uses a unique key to sign all its
apps. We can use this single-key pattern to fingerprint the
application generator. Whenever application generators use
distinct keys, we can still use further information about
the certificate to fingerprint the app, e.g., if all keys have
the same subject. AppYet apps, for instance, all share the
same certificate subject /C=CA /ST=ON /L=Oakville
/O=AppYet /CN=www.appyet.com.
Files—In addition to an app’s code, apps include a list of files
such as images, CSS, or configuration files. These files can
be used for the classification as well. For example, AppyPie
apps include the file appypie.xml in the assets/www
app folder. We moreover use file content for the classification,
e.g., we identify AppsGeyser apps, by verifying whether
the elements <webWidget> and <registeredUrl>
of res/raw/configuration.xml contain the URL
appgeyser.com.
2) Methodology: We start our classification by extracting
the aforementioned features from our set of sample apps.
We discovered that for each AppGen there are multiple
distinguishing features that allow to link the app back to its
generator. We further found that in all cases a single feature
Figure 1: Download counts for all apps from the top 5 OAGs
using buckets provided by Google Play.
would already be sufficient to unambiguously determine the
originating service. The overall classification of application
generators with respect to their features is depicted in Table 1
in the “Fingerprinting Features” columns.
As an orthogonal investigation, we also fingerprinted apps
that have not been created by means of application generators.
In this analysis, we considered the two major platforms for
Android app development: Eclipse ADT6—support ended in
August 2015—and Android Studio7. We manually investigated
apps developed with both IDEs similarly as described for ap-
plication generators. Our analysis revealed that Android Studio
apps can reliably be identified based on the files’ structure.
Apps developed and compiled with Android Studio include
a folder res/mipmap that stores launcher images. This
folder structure was introduced in Android Studio 1.18. Hence,
only apps developed with at least version 1.1 of Android
Studio can be identified using this feature. Neither Eclipse
ADT nor application generators apps we analyzed exhibited
this behaviour. In contrast, we could not find any reliable
identification feature for Eclipse ADT apps. To avoid false
positives, we limited our analyses to application generators
apps and Android Studio apps we could reliably identify.
C. Market Penetration
Our app corpus currently consists of 2,291,898 free apps
from Google Play. We managed to successfully classify
255,216 (11.14%) of these apps using our feature detection
as generated by OAGs. This is a lower bound based on the
OAGs we could reliably identify, since OAGs not considered
6http://developer.android.com/tools/help/adt.html
7http://developer.android.com/tools/studio/index.html
8https://androidbycode.wordpress.com/2015/02/14/goodbye-launcher-
drawables-hello-mipmaps/
Figure 2: Distribution OAG generated apps by Google Play
store categories. The Unknown category is for apps that are
not classified by the Google Play store
in our classification might be responsible for additional apps.
Based on meta data from Google Play, these generated apps
account for more than 1.14 bn downloads. Detailed app counts
per online service can be found in the market column of
Table 1. The numbers suggest that the majority of OAGs is
responsible only for a small fraction of the set of generated
apps. In contrast, the five most popular OAGs account for
73% of all generated apps, i.e., 8.12% of our corpus. While
the many OAG-generated apps have a small user base, there
is also a larger number (>17k apps) with a significant number
of at least 10,000 downloads (see Figure 1). Reasons for
this distribution of download counts originate in the limited
set of functionality offered by these services as opposed to
traditional app development. In the following, we characterize
OAG-generated apps based on the offered functionality.
D. OAG App Characterization
To better understand the potential complexity of the applica-
tion logic that can be implemented with OAGs, we inspected
online services’ development IDEs to count the number and
types of app components that can be connected to implement
the indented logic. We call component an app element with
a UI and that implements a specific task or functionality.
For example, components can be simple UI elements (e.g.,
buttons, forms, views) or complex modules/plugins (e.g., QR
scanners, calendar views, and login forms). The number of
components varies across OAGs and it ranges from 12 of
AppYet to 128 components of Seattle Cloud. This variety
indicates the level of customization that each OAG offers. We
also observed a great variety of components. For example,
Biznessapps offers 48 components all suitable for business
apps, e.g., membership management, mortgage calculator, and
loyalty program management components. Another interesting
example is Seattle Cloud which provides general-purpose
components including simple UI elements such as menu items
and image areas, as well as complex ones such as complete
PDF readers and barcode scanners.
This variety is also reflected in the different app categories
on Google Play. The app category is a string value in the app
metadata retrieved by our crawlers that identify the type of
app9. The ten most popular categories of OAG-generated apps
are shown in Figure 2. These categories cover apps with non-
trivial logic such as Business (e.g., document editor/reader,
email management, or job search apps), Entertainment (e.g.,
streaming video apps), and Games. These categories contain
all of the top nine OAG apps with 5M+ downloads. An
interesting aspect is that different OAG dominate different
app categories, thus suggesting product specialization. For
example, the most popular category of Seattle Cloud is Enter-
tainment with 11,073 apps, whereas the most popular category
for Biznessapps is Business with 9,030 apps.
IV. ANALYSIS METHODOLOGY
We now focus on the security of apps generated with OAGs.
The naive approach to analyze the security of our dataset
is to test all apps systematically. However, we observe that
OAG apps are produced in a streamlined process in which
app developers do not contribute with source code. We thus
hypothesize that the apps share an OAG-specific boilerplate
code and, as a consequence, either all generated apps share
a vulnerability or none. Accordingly, we first identify the
app generation model for each OAG, before we analyze the
security of the boilerplate code on both self-generated apps
and apps from Google Play.
A. Boilerplate App Model
To identify boilerplate apps, we first build the ground truth
with self-generated apps for different OAG. To this end, we
select the thirteen most popular OAGs based on their market
penetration in Table 1 and register as a customer. Among these,
six online services (Appmachine, Apps Builder, Biznessapps,
Como, Seattle Cloud, and GoodBarber) required us to pay
a subscription fee to be able to generate apps and to rent
backend resources, such as user management. For each online
service we create the same three custom apps to test whether
targeted code is generated depending on the selected modules
or whether boilerplate code with an app-specific configuration
file is output. We create the three custom apps as follows:
● App1: The first app constitutes the minimal app, i.e. the
smallest app that can be generated in terms of functional-
ity. In most cases, this app just displays a “Hello World”
message to the user.● App2: Builds on the minimal app but additionally per-
forms web requests to a web server we control. We
perform both HTTP and HTTPS requests to analyze the
transferred plaintext data and to test whether we can inject
malicious code and emulate web-to-app attacks [22], [13],
[32].
9A complete list of categories and descriptions can be found https://support.
google.com/googleplay/android-developer/answer/113475?hl=en
Table 2: Online services grouped by generation model: Mono-
lithic boilerplate apps with static/dynamic configuration files
and module-dependent boilerplate apps.
A. Monolithic Boilerplate Code
Static config Dynamic config
A.1 Native application
Apps Builder
Appmachine —
Biznessapps —
GoodBarber
Mobincube
A.2 HTML + Native app
Apps Geyser —
Appy Pie
AppYet —
Como
Seattle Cloud
Tobit Chayns —
B. Module-dependent Boilerplate Code
Andromo
Appinventor
= static config in plain / dyn. config loaded via HTTP
= static config decryptable / HTTPS downgrade
= static config encrypted / dyn. config loaded via HTTPS
● App3: The third app implements either a user login or a
form to submit user data to our server (if the application
generator provides modules for such functionality). We
chose such common functionality as it is supported by
the majority of AppGens and because handling user data
usually requires special care in terms of security. In our
test set, Appinventor, Biznessapps, and Como did not offer
such additional modules.
To test whether an AppGen generates boilerplate code or
module-dependent code we analyze the bytecode file(s) of
App1–App3 as well as 10 randomly selected apps from Google
Play for each service. In the majority of cases, it is sufficient to
compare the hash value of the classes.dex bytecode file to show
that different apps have the exact same code. If the file hash
differs we compute a Merkle hash tree over the class hierarchy
including package, class and method instruction information to
quickly estimate the code overlap (thereby following a similar
approach to the one to detect third-party libraries in [6]). The
results confirm our observation in which apps generated with
OAG are based on a common boilerplate code. In particular,
we can derive two distinct generation techniques: monolithic
boilerplate apps with configuration files and module-dependent
boilerplate code (see Table 2).
1) Monolithic Boilerplate Code: All but two online services
generate apps with the exact same application bytecode, i.e.
apps include code for all supported modules with additional
logic for layout transitions independent of what the app
developer has selected. Apps only differ in a configuration file
that is either statically included in the apk file or dynamically
loaded at runtime. Some OAGs support both options, e.g. to
deliver app updates as config file updates without the need
to change the apk file. Further this allows to bind the app to
the service providers’ backend servers. In this scenario, apks
only need to be updated when the online service changes its
boilerplate code. Boilerplate apps can be sub-categorized into
pure native applications, i.e., these apps include dex bytecode
and optionally libraries written in C/C++ (see category A.1),
and hybrid applications combining bytecode with HTML/JS
(A.2). For HTML/JS apps, bridge code is generated to interact
with the Android middleware, while HTML and Javascript is
used to render the apps’ user interface in a WebView.
2) Module-dependent Boilerplate Code: Two online ser-
vices, Andromo and Appinventor, generate module-dependent
boilerplate code for apps, i.e., only the boilerplate code for
modules enabled/added by the app developer is stored within
the apk file. Hence, apps share the same code for individual
modules, but the set of enabled modules might differ. Module-
dependent code requires a more complex app generation
process for the online service provider, however, the generated
apk is tailored to the configured modules and the chosen
layout. The app semantics are not controlled by a pre-defined
configuration file. While Andromo’s app assembly is close to
those of the other AppGens, Appinventor builds on GNU Kawa
and offers, besides modules, a kind of visual programming
to give the app developer the choice to implement if-then-
else conditions and loops on a high-level. This gives the app
developer a bit more freedom in customizing the application
but has a slightly steeper learning curve for citizen developers.
B. Security Audit
Following the initial analysis of the app generation model,
we then conduct a security audit on the generated boilerplate
code. To this end, we follow a dynamic-static approach. We
leverage dynamic testing to monitor the test apps’ runtime
behavior, e.g., obtain traces of the contacted domains dur-
ing execution and check the possibility of eavesdropping
or modifying those connections. We complement our tests
with static analysis (e.g., control-flow graphs, program slicing,
backtracking) to overcome the limitations of dynamic analysis,
e.g., code coverage. Similar to the analysis of the boilerplate
app model, we start our analysis with the self-generated
apps of Section IV-A. To remove any bias from our set of
self-generated apps, we cross-validate our findings with 10
randomly selected apps of the same OAG (=130 apps in
total), drawn from our Google Play app corpus. Finally, as the
configuration of apps can be provided dynamically by OAG’s
service, we extend our analysis to the OAG backend servers
and the client-server communication.
Our analysis identifies two new attack vectors which are
specific to the OAG generated apps, specifically reconfig-
uration and infrastructure attacks. We present these attacks
in Section V. We then test the boilerplate apps for well-
known security issues such as code injection vulnerabilities
and insecure WebViews. The results of this analysis are
presented in Section VI.
V. OAG-SPECIFIC ATTACK VECTORS
Given the inherently different generation model as com-
pared to traditional app creation, we now describe new OAG-
specific attack vectors—Application infrastructure attacks that
apply to all OAGs and app reconfiguration attacks that apply
to OAGs with monolithic boilerplate code only—and illustrate
weaknesses that we found during our security audit.
A. Application Reconfiguration Attacks
In our set of tested OAGs (see Table 2), 5/11 services use
either static or dynamically loaded config files exclusively,
while the remaining six OAGs use an hybrid approach. Dy-
namically loaded configs have the advantage that apps can
be updated on-the-fly without having to download an updated
apk file from an app store. Changes are instantly pushed onto
the end-users’ devices on startup. However, two AppGens—
Tobit Chayns and Biznessapps—do not persist their config
locally and thus require a permanent Internet connection to
work. As an example, Biznessapps—a paid service—uses this
as a license enforcement mechanism, i.e., app functionality
is disabled via the config file as soon as the app developer
no longer holds a valid license. In general, we found that
these configuration files carry any app-specific data, potentially
including the entire business logic of the app and secret
credentials. Hence, there is a strong incentive to carefully
protect this file in terms of integrity and confidentiality.
1) Static config files: In our test set, 7/9 static config files
are stored in plain and can be read and modified without
effort. Only AppYet encrypts its config file, however, at the
same time, the passphrase is hard-coded in the bytecode and
is identical for every AppYet app. This allows us to write
a simple encryption/decryption tool to read and modify the
AppYet config files. The Appmachine config was the only one
where we are not able to extract information. Appmachine is
built on top of Mono for Android, thus, most of the app code
is compiled to native code, including the classes that process
the non-human-readable config file10. As for the integrity
protection, we found that in the majority of cases standard
Android APIs are used to read these files directly from assets
or the raw directory. By inspecting the disassembled app code
we can, however, not find any additional integrity checks or
obfuscation logic for these config files. This allows, in all
but one case, to trivially extract the config file from an apk.
Cloning or repackaging apps becomes an easy task, since
no code has to be reverse engineered, only the app features
and properties within the config file–typically a .xml or .
json file—have to be understood once for each application
generator.
2) Dynamically loaded config files: Further, we found
that eight out of eleven OAGs (A.1+A.2) load config data
dynamically at runtime. All but Biznessapps and Tobit Chayns
use a hybrid model of static and dynamic config loading. In
five cases, the config is requested via HTTP and transmitted
10While we abstain from reversing this config file, we assume that, with
enough effort, it should be similarly possible to extract information.
in plain without any protection. Only three OAGs load the
config via SSL by default. For Mobincube, however, it is
possible to downgrade the request to HTTP. Moreover, none of
these AppGens uses public key pinning to prevent man-in-the-
middle attacks. Similar to static configs, the complete absence
of integrity checks and content encryption allows tampering
with the app’s business logic and data. This is fatal, since
in our tests we could on-the-fly re-configure app modules
(enabling, disabling, modification), disable advertisements (for
free AppGens), compromise app data (localized strings, about
information) or modify the application’s sync URL (AppYet).
Only few settings cannot be compromised when app content is
no longer retrievable from the server due to license expiration
(e.g. we found that 5,137 out of 27,130 Biznessapps in our
app set already expired).
Having the full control over the app’s data and business
logic as a network attacker allows a range of different attacks
to be mounted with moderate effort. Targeted phishing attacks
may allow stealing user data/credentials. On-the-fly replace-
ment of API keys for advertisement may allow an attacker
to steal ad revenue. Or an attacker may simply try to deface
the application which in turn affects the reputation of the app
developer.
B. Application Infrastructure Attacks
A large fraction of app generators bind their customers
to their web services, e.g., for user management or license
validation. Particularly, hybrid apps that make use of web
technology, like WebViews, to deliver the app’s logic, bind
the generated app to the generator service’s web infrastructure.
For instance, in our set of AppGens, Seattle Cloud, Bizness-
apps, and Como bind both their clients and end-users to their
service’s infrastructure, e.g., by managing the client’s user
data or by delivering the client app’s content to a generated
boilerplate app. Thus, the attack surface of the generated app
inherently increases beyond the app and its network connection
to the web service backend. Consequently, when considering
that a single service’s infrastructure can serve many hundreds
or thousands of generated apps, it is paramount that the
app generator service not only follows best practices, such
as correctly verifying certificates, but also that the service’s
infrastructure maintains highest security standards for their
web services. Of particular interest is here, whether such
services are resilient to remote attackers, i.e., against state-
of-the-art attacks against SSL/TLS [14], [33], [5], [3], [10],
[1] that affect content delivery either to generated apps or app
data to the service.
We extract the domains of the different services’ backend
servers from the generated apps and use available online
analysis sites (e.g., Qualys SSL Labs11) to check the SSL/TLS
security of respective backend servers. This particularly in-
cludes checks for trusted and valid certificates, support for
outdated and weak ciphers and protocols, resilience against
recent SSL/TLS vulnerabilities, usage of weak keys, and
11https://www.ssllabs.com/ssltest/
checks whether any domain contacted by default by generated
apps is known to distribute malware (e.g., using Google’s
SafeBrowsing12 service).
The results of analyzing the communication with the server
backend are alarming. First of all, only Tobit Chayns and
Biznessapps use encryption consistently for any communi-
cation with the backend, while Apps Geyser completely ab-
stains from secure communication (i.e., HTTP only) and the
other services secure their communication only partially. For
instance, both Seattle Cloud and Como send sensitive data
from user input forms like a login form completely in plain
text. Moreover, only three services use a valid and trusted
server certificate, while, for instance, Appy Pie uses a self-
signed server certificate and Mobincube uses a certificate that
expired seven years ago. From a cryptographic point of view,
all of the services are running an outdated version of SSL
libraries that are prone to one or more recent attacks such as
POODLE [33], BEAST [14], LOGJAM [3], or FREAK [10].
Mobincube’s server was even vulnerable against all of the
tested SSL vulnerabilities.
Data leakage and Privacy Violations: OAGs typically offer
modules to connect to third-party services, like Google Maps
or social media platforms like Facebook and Twitter. These
modules include code to connect to these services via service-
specific APIs. Using these APIs typically requires an API key
(and secret). Since OAGs do not create third-party accounts
on behalf of the application developer, those AppGens provide
their own API key (and secret) to any app created by its
service. Some keys require a fee for business/volume usage,
like Google Maps keys, hence it is of interest if the OAG
protects these keys from (easy) eavesdropping. The combi-
nation of leaked Twitter key and secret, e.g., hard-coded in
boilerplate code of Biznessapps, allows to send arbitrary au-
thorized requests and in particular to tamper with the account
that is shared across all apps generated with this AppGens.
Although those keys are application-only authentication keys
with limited access rights, the Twitter developer documenta-
tion recommends that these "should be considered as sensitive
as passwords, and must not be shared or distributed to
untrusted parties."13 We found keys and secrets for various
different third-party providers unobfuscated in config files,
hardcoded in boilerplate code, in the AndroidManifest file,
and even in the strings.xml. All identified keys were exactly
the same across all analyzed apps, underlining the security
impact of boilerplate apps. We could not find a single attempt
to obfuscate or protect these keys/secrets.
Besides paid-only services, a large number of AppGens
provide their service for free. Similar to normal app devel-
opment they use different approaches to monetize their apps,
such as advertisement and/or tracking. Since the literature
has shown that such third-party libraries often leak sensitive
user data [27], [43], we especially checked outgoing app
traffic and compared our findings with the privacy policies
12https://developers.google.com/safe-browsing/
13https://dev.twitter.com/oauth/application-only
provided by the online service. The results suggest that none
of the web domains that the tested apps contacted during our
analyses was known for distributing malware. However, four
application generators (Como, Mobincube, Biznessapps, and
Appy Pie) clearly exhibited questionable tracking behavior.
Apps generated with Mobincube sent more than 250 tracking
requests within the first minute of execution. In addition,
Mobincube includes the third-party library BeaconsInSpace to
perform user tracking via Bluetooth beacons without the user
noticing it. Although BeaconsInSpace strongly recommends
updating the privacy policy of apps using their library, we
could not find any information in Mobincube’s terms and
conditions. Appy Pie apps contacted Google Analytics, Appy
Pie’s backend, and Facebook for tracking. Apps generated by
Como automatically registered with different tracking web-
sites, including Google Analytics, Como-owned servers, and
others. Biznessapps sends device identifier and location to their
backend servers on app launch. While such extensive tracking
behavior is already questionable for the free services of Appy
Pie and Mobincube, one would certainly not expect this for
paid services like Como and Biznessapps.
VI. EVALUATING KNOWN SECURITY ISSUES
In addition to the specific attack vectors of online services
discussed in Section IV, we further analyzed the generated
apps’ boilerplate code for violations of security best practices
on Android [23] and vulnerabilities identified by prior research
on Android application security and privacy [2], e.g., testing
the apps’ device-local attack surfaces, such as unprotected
components. Again, we used our set of self-generated apps
as well as the set of generated apps from Google Play for
cross-validation. Whenever feasible we run static tests against
the entire set of generated apps from Google Play. Table 3
provides an overview of the security analysis results, which
we discuss in more detail in the remainder of this section. We
distinguish apps in vulnerable, non vulnerable, and risky. We
say that an app is vulnerable ( ) when we successfully exploit
the flaw. We say that an app is risky ( ) when an exploitation
scenario exists, but we did not (or could not) reproduce it.
Otherwise, we say that the app is not vulnerable ( ).
A. Best-practice Permission Usage (P1–P3)
Apps may request more permissions than actually
needed [37], [4], which unnecessarily increases the privileges
of third-party code, such as ad libs, that have been shown
to actively exploit such inherited privileges and to exhibit
questionable privacy-violating behavior [26], [11], [40], [43].
The Android security best practices also explicitly recommend
developers to request as few permissions as possible to con-
form to the principle of least privilege.
Moreover, Android apps are by design allowed to engage
in inter-component communication (ICC [16]). However, apps
that (unintentionally) export their components for access by
other applications, but with no or only insufficient protec-
tion, may leak privacy-sensitive data or security-sensitive
methods to unprivileged attacker apps [45], [31], [25]—a
scenario also warned about in the security best practices. In
addition, for certain components, such as Activities or
BroadcastReceivers, the app developer has only very
limited means to identify or authorize the sender app [9].
This opens the opportunity for Intent spoofing attacks [12],
[35] and confused deputy attacks [37], where a vulnerable
component acts on behalf of an ICC message from an attacker
app.
Security analysis: To detect whether an application is
overprivileged, we identify the permission-protected API calls
in the application (using PScout’s [4] and Axplorer’s [8]
permission maps) and derive from those the set of required per-
missions. We complement this list with ContentProvider
and Intent permissions necessary for the app to run
properly. We then compare the resulting set with the set of
actually requested permissions in the application’s manifest.
If the latter one is a strict superset of the former one, we call
the application overprivileged.
We further check applications for explicitly exported
Activity, Service, and ContentProvider compo-
nents or potentially accidentally exported components (e.g.,
by setting an intent-filter without manually setting flag
android:exported to false). If any of those exported
components is not protected with a permission with at least
signature protection level, we consider this app as exposing
an unprotected component. To also detect receivers potentially
prone to Intent spoofing attacks, we conduct the same anal-
ysis as above for BroadcastReceivers , but additionally
considering receivers registered dynamically at runtime via the
app’s context.
Results: All AppGens that generate monolithic boilerplate
code create over-privileged apps by design (P1 in Table 3). As
long as an app developer chooses a subset of modules (from
the set of 12–128 modules across AppGens), the resulting app
has, with a high percentage, more permissions than actually
necessary. For instance, the simple Hello World app (App1)
has between 7–21 permissions for monolithic boilerplate apps,
including camera access, write/read contacts, audio recording,
Bluetooth admin, and location access. At the same time
App1 of Andromo and Appinventor—that generate module-
dependent code—request only a single permission and three
permissions, respectively.
Application generators do not satisfactorily protect gener-
ated apps’ components from illicit access (P2). Except for
Andromo, AppInventor, and Biznessapps, all tested generators
failed to protect one or more components that we identified
through manual analysis (e.g., using their package and class
name) to be intended as internally-accessible only. This can
potentially lead to severe implications for the end-users’ or
app generator clients’ privacy. For example, apps generated
with the Seattle Cloud or Mobincube service expose unpro-
tected components for an InternalFileContentProv-
ider and AppContentProvider, respectively, through
which an attacker can read all files to which the app’s
UID has access, including internal files like databases, pri-
vate shared preferences, or in case of Seattle Cloud the
Table 3: Categorization of considered attack vectors against generated apps in the Android ecosystem.
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P1. Overprivileged Apps
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P6. Fracking Attacks
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= vulnerable; = not vulnerable = risky
asset file app.xml [39] in which Seattle Cloud apps store,
among other things, the user accounts and passwords for
logging into the app. We statically searched for this vulnerable
InternalFileContentProvider in 60,314 apps from
Seattle Cloud and found it in 100% of those apps. We
also discovered the vulnerable AppContentProvider in
7,953 (98.5%) of analyzed 8,074 Mobincube apps in our test
set.14 This underlines the high security impact of application
generators that are using vulnerable boilerplate code. We also
discovered that unprotected components are not always within
the package domain of the application generator service,
but can sometimes be traced back to included third party
packages, e.g., by Radius Networks or ZXing, and it remains
to be determined whether the app generator failed to correctly
protect such third party components or whether the design of
those components prohibits a more secure integration.
A particularly worrisome aspect are unprotected
BroadcastReceivers and Activity components
that might accept spoofed Intents from untrusted senders
and act upon such received data (P3). Eight of the tested
application generators produce code that is prone to such
Intent spoofing attacks. For example, Appinventor apps
react to a fake SMS notification, Mobincube apps can be
triggered to interact with the WiFi service, and Appmachine-
generated apps have a remote command receiver exposed that
forwards received Intents unfiltered to a native command
for execution.
B. Insecure Cryptographic API Usage (P4)
App developers might use cryptographic APIs to secure
their data on the end-user device. However, the security that
cryptographic APIs can actually deliver, strongly depends on
14We believe that the 121 apps without this provider are older, dis-
continued apps, built or last updated prior to the introduction of the
AppContentProvider.
the correct usage of the cryptographic building blocks (e.g., ad-
equate block cipher modes, correct salting, etc.). App develop-
ers frequently make mistakes when using those primitives [15],
such as using ECB mode for encryption, using a non-random
IV for CBC encryption, or using constant salts/seeds (see
also [24]). The Android security best practices documentation
picked up some of these recommendations and, for instance,
advises using SecureRandom instead of Random, initializ-
ing cryptographic keys with KeyGenerator, or using the
Cipher class for encryption with AES and RSA.
Security analysis: To detect misuse of cryptographic APIs,
we re-apply the analysis methodology presented in [15] by
leveraging R-Droid [7] to search for usage of cryptographic
API methods and then track their parameters. To this end,
we focused on APIs in Android’s javax.crypto package.
For symmetric encryption, we analyzed the usage of the
Cipher.getInstance parameter, where developers are
expected to specify a symmetric encryption algorithm, mode
and padding—e.g."AES/CBC/PKCS5Padding". Similar to
related work and security best practices, we rated the use of
the ECB mode of operation as insecure and rated, additionally,
the following outdated algorithms as insecure: (3)DES, IDEA,
RC4, and Blowfish. Moreover, the use of non-random IVs for
CBC mode or in general the use of a static encryption key is
rated as insecure.
To use hash functions, app developers are recommended
to use the MessageDigest class, where the hash func-
tion’s algorithm can be chosen via a string parameter—
-e.g. "SHA-256". App developers can include message
authentication codes (MACs) into their apps by using the
Mac.getInstance API call. Again, MAC algorithms
are expected to be passed as a string parameter—e.g.
"HmacSHA256". For hash functions and MACs, we consider
the use of MD2, MD4, MD5, SHA0, SHA1 and Ripemd128
as insecure.
Regarding sources of randomness, we consider the usage of
Random instead of SecureRandom as insecure; however,
usage of SecureRandom is also rated as insecure when a
static seed is used.
Results: Seven out of thirteen tested app generators failed to
use Android’s cryptographic APIs securely. A rather patholog-
ical weakness seems to be using an insecure random number
generator. We discovered in five of seven vulnerable AppGens
that Random values are generated with a static initialization
vector, and most frequently used when generating symmet-
ric encryption keys or initialization vectors for CBC-mode
symmetric encryption, rendering the generated apps prone
to cryptanalytic attacks. For instance, Biznessapps creates
predictable session identifiers by concatenating the output of
Random with the current system time. Additionally, three
of those generators relied on the insecure ECB mode for
encryption.
C. Insecure WebViews (P5–P8)
App developers frequently fail in validating SSL/TLS cer-
tificates correctly [17], [18], [41], [21], making their apps
vulnerable against man-in-the-middle attacks. The Android
security best practices have a dedicated, extensive section on
security with HTTPS and SSL, explaining the pitfalls and their
solutions in implementing a secure SSL connection and even
providing tools for testing the SSL configurations of apps.
Moreover, web utility classes, such as WebView, allow
app developers to combine the features of web apps (e.g.,
platform independent languages) with those of native Android
apps (e.g., rich access to the device’s resources). However, the
access controls that govern web code (e.g., JavaScript from
different web domains) and local code (i.e., Android native
code) are not properly composed: the bridge code between web
code and local code can interact with the Android system with
the same access rights as its native host application, but does
not enforce the same origin policy on calls from the web code
to the bridge functions, thus opening this dangerous bridge
interface to all loaded web code. The security best practices
suggest to enable JavaScript only if really necessary, to prevent
cross-site scripting. In addition, it warns that bridges between
web code and local code should be used only for websites from
which all input is trusted, as it allows fracking attacks [22],
[13], [32].
This lack of origin-based protection of the JavaScript bridge
also opens the door for various origin-crossing attacks. A
particularly concerning cross-origin attack is based on the
scheme mechanism. Schemes allow apps on the device to be
invoked through URLs whose scheme part equals the scheme
registered by the app. However, any app can register for
arbitrary schemes. In combination with WebViews this allows
for unauthorized cross-origin attacks [44], when the user clicks
on a malicious link in the WebView, which refers to a local
application that might act on the parameters given by the URL.
Lastly, Android’s programming model allows app develop-
ers to dynamically load code from different sources, such
as public application packages, dex files, or the web via
WebViews. However, if the application does not correctly
verify the integrity and authenticity of loaded code, the app
becomes vulnerable to be compromised by an attacker that
can modify the loaded (or injected) code. This attack has to
be differentiated between platform native code (i.e., dex or
C/C++) [36] and web code (HTML, JavaScript) [29], [34]. In
the former attack, the attacker is able to modify the loaded
code, e.g., dex bytecode on the local file system or inject
malicious code into the download stream of such loaded
code. In the latter attack, the attacker achieves execution
of custom JavaScript code within a trusted website in a
WebView or manages to navigate a WebView away from
a benign, safe website to an attacker-controlled website. As
a result, the attacker can control the web resources within
the compromised WebView (e.g., to exfiltrate credentials) and
further leverage the WebView’s host app’s privileges to the
extent they are exposed through bridge code between host
app and WebView instance. Android’s security best practices
strongly discourages app developers from dynamically loading
code from outside of their application for the aforementioned
reasons and, again, recommends only loading web code from
trusted websites.
Security analysis: We tracked the parameters of the
HTTPUrlConnection and HTTPSUrlConnection
classes respectively. We rated plain HTTP URLs as
insecure and HTTPS URLs as secure. Moreover, we
investigate the use of non-default TrustManager,
SSLSocketFactory, or HostnameVerifier
implementations with permissive verification strategies,
which we deem as insecure. Additionally, for WebViews we
search for custom SSLErrorHandler implementations in
the WebViewClient with a permissive or insecure error
handling, which we deem as insecure.
We classify WebViews that enable JavaScript as in-
secure when the bridge functions expose security- and
privacy-sensitive functionality, and as secure if those op-
tions are disabled or non-critical functionality is exposed.
Since apps with target SDK 19 or higher reject mixed con-
tent by default, we consider those secure, unless develop-
ers used the setMixedContentMode method with the
MIXED_CONTENT_ALWAYS_ALLOW parameter to deviate
from the default; in this case, we consider the app’s behaviour
insecure according to the previously described metrics.
We further investigate the presence and implementa-
tion of the shouldOverrideUrlLoading() method of
WebViewClient. We consider the app prone to origin
crossing if the WebViewClient is missing, i.e., the opening
of the URL is deferred to some installed app registered for
the URL’s scheme. Additionally, we consider the app prone
to this attack if a WebViewClient is present, but it’s
implementation of the shouldOverrideUrlLoading()
defers the URL loading to apps via sending Intents with
the URL as parameter.
To determine whether apps load external code, we check
for API calls to DexClassLoader and subclasses that load
code over (insecure) network connections, which we consider
insecure behavior. Apps that use the URLClassLoader
with HTTP URLs are of particular danger. In case of
WebViews, we consider code injection possible if ei-
ther the WebView uses insecure Internet connections or
if the WebViewClient is present but does not override
the shouldOverrideUrlLoading() function (or im-
plements a permissive URL overriding that opens attacker
provided links in the WebView). In those cases, an attacker
can potentially lure the WebView to an attacker-controlled
website.
Results: Six of the tested application generators rely on web
technology, i.e., WebViews, to display their client’s content.
Thus, for those app generators it is paramount to prevent
untrusted content from being loaded into the WebView
or securely sandboxing the WebView’s interaction with
the Android system and other installed apps. Out of the
thirteen tested app generators, six failed to correctly handle
SSL certificate verification errors and accept any self-signed
certificate (P5), which also eases the task of an attacker to
inject code into a WebView by manipulating the download
stream (P8). Apps Geyser catches verification errors, defers
the decision about the trustworthiness of the certificate,
however, to the end-user, who has repeatedly been shown
in the literature to be unable to make such trust decisions
correctly [38]. At the same time, we found that none of the
investigated online services implemented measures to enhance
the SSL security, e.g., by pinning the certificate. Similarly, we
discovered that only about half of the tested apps correctly
limited the scope of navigation inside the WebViews or
enforce a same origin policy on the loaded web content,
thus opening the possibility to navigate the WebView to
untrusted web resources that deliver malicious code with
full access to the JavaScript bridge to native platform code.
This is particularly worrisome when considering that almost
all of the tested generators with WebViews expose quite
substantial JavaScript interfaces and hence enable fracking
attacks (P6). For instance, Apps Geyser exposes over 90
JavaScript bridge functions, providing an attacker with all
tools needed, such as camera and microphone access, storage
access, or Intent sending. Mobincube and Appy Pie even
exceed this number by exposing more than 100 functions,
including methods such as createCalendarEvent,
getCurrentPosition, getGalleryImage,
makeCall, sendSMS, takeCameraPicture,
uploadMultipleFiles, or processHTML. Further
noticeable is that several of the tested generators convert the
loading of a custom URL in the WebView (e.g., through a
crafted link provided by the attacker) to an Intent that will
be sent by the generated app to other installed apps. This
opens the possibility for cross-origin attacks (P7).
VII. DISCUSSION
We now interpret the key findings of our online applica-
tion generator study and propose some short and long-term
actionable items to improve the current status quo.
A. Citizen App Developers on the Rise
The first key finding of our study is that citizen developers
are indeed a growing phenomenon in the mobile application
development ecosystem. As AppGens promise to decrease
the app’s development costs, more and more organizations
are interested in this new development paradigm. Financial
reports, already in 2011, expected citizen developers to build
at least 25% of new business applications by 2014 [20], with
an estimated a total revenues of $1.7 Billion in 2015 and
an expected growth of +50% per year [19]. Our analysis is
the first to confirm the growth forecast in terms of market
penetration for the mobile ecosystem, showing that at least
11% of free apps in Google Play (250K apps) are already
generated by Online Services.
B. Pitfalls of the “One Size Fits All” AppGens’ Strategy
Online Services provide simple means of creating apps
without requiring any knowledge about programming or mo-
bile operating systems. This is achieved by abstracting the
implementation task to some kind of drag-and-drop assembly
of predefined modules and by limiting the degree of freedom
of app customization. Such a “One Size Fits All” strategy
led to a new paradigm in app generation, distributing an apk
file with monolithic or module-dependent boilerplate code that
is statically or dynamically configured with an app-specific
config file. While this provides a convenient way to generate
and distribute applications for a large number of clients, from a
security perspective, this creates new points of failures, that, if
not considered carefully, might compromise end-user security
or even online service security.
The results in Section IV show that the majority of OAGs
that base their business model on monolithic boilerplate apps
fail to properly protect config files from tampering and eaves-
dropping. Only 2 out 8 OAGs in Table 2 correctly use HTTPS
to retrieve config files. Moreover, we found that none of
the services applied certificate pinning to prevent man-in-
the-middle attacks. Similarly, only a single service properly
protected its statically included config. However, none of
the services checked the integrity of the config file during
app launch. This opens the door for many attacks such as
reconfiguration attacks, ad revenue theft (through replacing
API keys), and, in general, changing arbitrary app-specific
data.
Boilerplate apps that use HTML/JS for layouting (see cat-
egory A2 in Table 2) are additionally prone to code injection
and fracking attacks (P6–P8 in Table 3). This is caused by the
web-to-app bridge these services use to access the Android
API. Due to the boilerplate app pattern, these bridges expose
more functionality than typically necessary and/or are not
properly protected from being misused.
Following the principle of least privilege, Andromo and
Appinventor (see category B) generate targeted boilerplate
code based on the modules selected by the app developer.
Since their code generation model follows the traditional app
development, they are not prone to OAG-specific security
problems such reconfiguration attacks. However, the trade-off
is an additional code generation effort, when any combination
of pre-defined modules must be flawlessly composable. This
is why Andromo, with only 19 available modules, is at the
lower end in terms of available modules, while Appinventor
with its community support offers notable 59 modules.
C. Amplification of Security Issues
The increasing use of online services has shifted the duty of
generating secure code from app developers to the generator
service. Users rarely have options to customize or change their
application beyond the ones provided by the service. As a
consequence, users have to fully trust the service to generate
non-vulnerable code and to not include hidden or non-obvious
user tracking or data leakage. Particularly worrisome examples
include the paid service Como, that performs heavy user
tracking although its privacy policy explicitly emphasizes the
importance of the security of the users’ personal information
and Mobincube that silently tracks users via BLE beacons
without explicitly stating this in its terms and conditions.
The results of our security evaluation in Section VI suggest
that OAG-generated apps do hardly adhere to security best
practices and exhibit common app vulnerabilities that have
been identified by prior research. Although these findings are
in line with coding practices of traditional developers, the
worrisome aspect is the amplification effect of online services,
putting millions of users and their private data at risk. Another
key insight is, as opposed to traditional apps, vulnerabilities in
unused boilerplate code can still be exploited when a network
attacker is able to compromise the application config and re-
configure or activate app modules with known security issues
or when ContentProviders can be queried to retrieve
internal data (see Section VI-A).
We conclude that in the current online service ecosystem the
level of security does not depend on whether it is a free or paid
service, but rather on the underlying app generation model.
For the two module-dependent code generators Andromo and
Appinventor we found the least security issues. Particularly for
Appinventor this is unsurprising, since it is open-source and
does not follow commercial interests. The boilerplate model is
not generally insecure, however, from a security perspective,
server communication and config protection require a more
careful design. This could include certificate pinning for
dynamically retrieved configs, obfuscation or encryption of
static configs, and integrity checks to prevent unauthorized
tampering.
D. Missed Opportunity for a Large-Scale Security Impact
A patch to the current situation is to inform online services
about the discovered security issues to allow them to fix
their code generation. We are currently in the process of a
responsible disclosure to allow the respective service providers
to fix the security flaws. However, while this is a short-term
mitigation, it does not address the root cause of these issues,
thus not producing more desirable long-lasting effects. In our
opinion, OAG services need a thorough investigation from
the research community in the way AppGens are built. This
investigation requires a solid understanding of the underly-
ing technique in use. Other areas of research from which
lessons can be learned or transferred are tailored software
stacks. Prior works have shown that the attack surface can
be considerably reduced by compile-time [30] and run-time
configurations [42].
VIII. CONCLUSION
In this paper we present the first classification of commonly
used online services for Android based on various character-
istics and quantify the market penetration of these AppGens
based on a corpus of 2,291,898 free Android apps from Google
Play to discover that at least 11.1% of these apps were created
using online services. Based on a systematic analysis of the
new boilerplate app generation model, we show that online
services fall short in protecting against reconfiguration attacks
and running a secure infrastructure. A subsequent security
audit of the generated boilerplate code reveals that OAGs make
the same security mistakes as traditional app developers. But
in contrast, they carry the sole responsibility of generating
secure and privacy-preserving code. Due to their amplification
effect—a single error by an OAG potentially affects thousands
of generated apps (250K apps in our data set)—we conclude
that Online Services currently have a negative impact on the
security of the overall app ecosystem. But, at the same time,
these services are in the unique position to turn these negative
aspects into positive ones through spending more effort into
securing their application model and infrastructure from which
ultimately millions of users benefit.
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